Hosted flow

The hosted flow is the capture experience your user sees: consent, document photos, selfie, submit. It talks to the /v1/session/* endpoints with a client token — never an API key. Most integrations let idcheck.now's hosted page (or the SDK) drive these calls; they are documented here so you can build a fully custom capture UI if you need to.

How the hosted flow works

POST /v1/verifications returns a client_token and a hosted url of the form https://idcheck.now/verify/{id}?token={client_token}. The hosted page sends the token as X-Client-Token on every session call. The token is valid for 30 minutes and authorizes exactly one verification. All session endpoints are relative to https://idcheck.now.

Get session state

To recover after a reload, GET /v1/session/state with the client token. It returns the current status, any decision, and boolean flags describing what has been captured so far.

curl https://idcheck.now/v1/session/state -H "X-Client-Token: $CLIENT_TOKEN"

const res = await fetch("https://idcheck.now/v1/session/state", {
  headers: { "X-Client-Token": clientToken },
});
const state = await res.json(); // {status, has_front, has_back, has_selfie, ...}

import requests

res = requests.get(
    "https://idcheck.now/v1/session/state",
    headers={"X-Client-Token": client_token},
)
state = res.json()

{
  "id": "b3f1c2a4-7d5e-4f6a-9c8b-1e2d3a4b5c6d",
  "verificationId": "b3f1c2a4-7d5e-4f6a-9c8b-1e2d3a4b5c6d",
  "status": "doc_front",
  "decision": null,
  "score": null,
  "expires_at": "2026-07-27T14:03:11.204512",
  "has_consent": true,
  "has_front": true,
  "has_back": false,
  "has_selfie": false
}

Capture consent

To record consent, POST /v1/session/consent. Both bipa (biometric consent) and recording must be true — anything else returns 422 consent is required to proceed. The server stores the policy version, timestamp, IP and user agent, then transitions the verification to consented.

Request body

curl -X POST https://idcheck.now/v1/session/consent -H "X-Client-Token: $CLIENT_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"bipa": true, "recording": true, "policy_version": "2026-07-01"}'

await fetch("https://idcheck.now/v1/session/consent", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "X-Client-Token": clientToken, "Content-Type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({ bipa: true, recording: true, policy_version: "2026-07-01" }),
});

requests.post(
    "https://idcheck.now/v1/session/consent",
    headers={"X-Client-Token": client_token},
    json={"bipa": True, "recording": True, "policy_version": "2026-07-01"},
)

{
  "status": "consented"
}

Submit a document image

To submit a driver's-license image, POST /v1/session/document once per side. The front call stores the image and moves the state to doc_front. The back call runs the barcode pipeline: the raw PDF417 payload is parsed server-side (AAMVA CDS v01–v12), validated, and — when an image is supplied — independently re-decoded on the server and compared against the client-supplied barcode. A mismatch is recorded as a tamper signal.

Request body

curl -X POST https://idcheck.now/v1/session/document -H "X-Client-Token: $CLIENT_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"side": "back", "image_b64": "/9j/4AAQSkZJRg...", "barcode_raw": "@<RS>ANSI 636014090002DL00410278ZV03190008DLDAQD1234567..."}'

const res = await fetch("https://idcheck.now/v1/session/document", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "X-Client-Token": clientToken, "Content-Type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({ side: "back", image_b64, barcode_raw, barcode_parsed }),
});
const { status, sha256, parsed, checks } = await res.json();

requests.post(
    "https://idcheck.now/v1/session/document",
    headers={"X-Client-Token": client_token},
    json={"side": "back", "image_b64": image_b64, "barcode_raw": barcode_raw},
)

{
  "status": "doc_back",
  "sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855",
  "parsed": {"DAQ": "D1234567", "DCS": "DOE", "DAC": "JANE", "DBB": "06151990", "DBA": "04172029", "DAJ": "PA"},
  "checks": {
    "mandatory_elements": {"passed": true, "missing": []},
    "not_expired": {"passed": true, "expiry": "2029-04-17"},
    "server_client_barcode_match": {"passed": true}
  }
}

Submit a selfie

To submit the liveness capture, POST /v1/session/selfie with a short video and/or up to 8 still frames. The server runs face matching (license portrait vs selfie, threshold 0.6), passive liveness (threshold 0.5), and the 1:N duplicate-face search against previously verified faces. At least one of video_b64 or frames_b64 is required (422 otherwise).

Request body

curl -X POST https://idcheck.now/v1/session/selfie -H "X-Client-Token: $CLIENT_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"frames_b64": ["/9j/4AAQSkZJRg...", "/9j/4B1SkZKms..."]}'

const res = await fetch("https://idcheck.now/v1/session/selfie", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "X-Client-Token": clientToken, "Content-Type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({ frames_b64: frames }),
});
const { face_match_score, liveness_score } = await res.json();

requests.post(
    "https://idcheck.now/v1/session/selfie",
    headers={"X-Client-Token": client_token},
    json={"frames_b64": frames},
)

{
  "status": "selfie",
  "face_match_score": 0.91,
  "liveness_score": 0.88
}

Submit for decision

To finalize, POST /v1/session/submit (empty body) once at least the back document has been processed. Submit is only allowed from status selfie or doc_back — anything else returns 409 cannot submit from status <status>. The server runs OFAC screening on the document identity, applies the duplicate-face impact, computes the decision, dispatches the verification.decided webhook, and enrolls the face embeddings for future 1:N checks — all synchronously.

curl -X POST https://idcheck.now/v1/session/submit -H "X-Client-Token: $CLIENT_TOKEN"

const res = await fetch("https://idcheck.now/v1/session/submit", {
  method: "POST", headers: { "X-Client-Token": clientToken },
});
const { decision, score, reasons } = await res.json();

res = requests.post(
    "https://idcheck.now/v1/session/submit",
    headers={"X-Client-Token": client_token},
)
result = res.json()  # {"status": "decided", "decision": ..., "score": ..., "reasons": [...]}

{
  "status": "decided",
  "decision": "approve",
  "score": 96.2,
  "reasons": []
}

State machine

The decision object

The decision engine sums weighted signals into a 0–100 score, then applies hard compliance and fraud overrides. The score is always visible; overrides can push the decision below what the score alone implies.

Overrides (applied after scoring; none can raise the decision):

• Degraded ML (face match or liveness unavailable) caps an approve at review (ml_degraded_capped_at_review).
• OFAC strong match → decline (ofac_match); possible caps at review (ofac_possible_match); screening unavailable caps at review (ofac_screen_unavailable) — a compliance check never fails open.
• Duplicate face under a different identity → decline (face_duplicate_different_identity); face seen before → caps at review (face_seen_before); dedupe unavailable caps at review.

Document checks (doc_checks)

Every check that ran is stored on the verification under checks.doc_checks (see retrieve a verification). The complete check catalog:

All reason strings the engine can emit are listed in the error & reason reference.